讲座题目：Robust Moral Hazard and Information Availability

主讲人：Dr. Erick Li

主持人：欧锦文教授

时间：2018年10月11日 (周四)

15：00 - 16：30

地点：暨南大学管理学院314室

讲座摘要：

We propose a distribution-free approach to solving a moral hazard model in which a max-min principal hires an agent who selects the outcome distribution subject to moment constraints. Our formulation reveals that the model has an alternative interpretation of two-sided ambiguity where the principal and agent have opposing robust decision rules but form congruent expectations on the distribution selected by nature. The congruent expectation enables a reformulation of the problem into a linear program which provides a tractable approach to solving the robust contract without requiring Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions. The robust optimal contract is linear when the principal only knows the mean of the effort-outcome relationship. However, when the principal’s available information also includes the variance, a quadratic contract is robustly optimal and achieves the first best.

主讲人介绍：

Erick (Zhaolin) Li received a Ph.D. in Business Administration from The Pennsylvania State University. Currently he is a Senior Lecturer at The University of Sydney Business School. According to Babbar et al., (2017, 2018), he is among Asia’s top 25 scholars in Operations Management (OM) and Supply Chain Management (SCM).